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as to the defendants Dewey Letsinger and Bert Metz the judgment is modified by striking therefrom that portion in which
the plaintiff is awarded $2,500 as
and as
so modified the judgment as to them is
to
recover costs on

The petitions of Bert Metz and Dewey Letsinger for a
rehearing vvere denied December 24, 1956.

[Crim. No. 5913.

In Bank.

Nov. 30, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WIIJLIAlVI BRIDGEHOUSE,
Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Voluntary Manslaughter.-Voluntary manslaughter
is a wilful act characterized by the presence of an intent to
kill engendered by sufficient provocation and the absence of
premeditation, deliberation and (by presumption of law) malice
aforethought.
[2] !d.-Voluntary Manslaughter.-To be sufficient to reduce a
homicide to manslaughter, the heat of passion must be such
as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinary,
reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances, or
in the mind of a person of ordinary self-control.
[3] !d.-Voluntary Manslaughter-Provocation.-Where the evidence showed that defendant's wife was having an affair with
the deceased which extended over a considerable period of
time, that she would neither approve of defendant commencing
a divorce action nor forego seeing the deceased, that the sight
of the deceased in his mother-in-law's home was a t,rr·eat shock
to defendant who had not expected to see him there or anywhere else, and that defendant, a man of excellant character
was then mentally and emotionally exhausted and was white
and shaking, there was adequate provocation to provoke in
the reasonable man such a heat of passion as would render an
ordinary man of average disposition likely to act rashly or
without due deliberation and reflection, so as to reduce the
homicide committed by defendant to manslaughter.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 125; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 19.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Homicide,§ 22; [3] Homicide,§ 23;
[4] Homicide, § 196; [5] Homicide, § 273.
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[47 C.2d 406; 303 P.2d 1018]

[ 4]

!d.-Instructions-Defenses-Unconsciousness.~Where

there
was some evidence in a murder prosecution indicating that
defendant was unconscious at the time of killing his wife's
paramour, an instruction on such defense should have been

[5] !d.-Appeal-Modification of Judgment.-vVhere the evidence
is
insufficient to support a judgment of second degree
murder but is legally sufficient to support a judgment of
manslaughter, the Supreme Court has the power under Pen.
Code, § 1181, to reduce the degree of the crime from second
degree murder to that of manslaughter.

APPE.A.L from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Joe
Raycraft, Judge. Modified and cause remanded with directions.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of second
degree murder modified, and cause remanded to trial court
with directions to enter judgment against defendant for manslaughter.
Eugene V. McPherson and Gladys Towles Root for Appellant.
Edmund G. Browu, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Miller,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendant, William Bridgehouse was convicted, after trial by jury, of second degree murder of William
Bahr. His plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was tried,
by stipulation, by the court and he was adjudged sane both
presently and at the time of the commission of the crime. The
appeal is from the judgment of conviction and the denial of
his motion for a new trial.
Defendant who was 31 years of age, married Marylou
Bridgehouse in 1951. At the time of the crime, they had a
son, Danny, who was 2% years old. 1\<Irs. Bridgehouse had
a son by a prior marriage who, at the time of the crime, was
6¥2 years of age. At some time early in 1954, defendant met
the deceased who was a part time bartender as well as a commercial fisherman and an engineer on construction work.
Mrs. Bridgehouse had known Bahr for more than six years.
After defendant met Bahr, he and his wife had discussed her
relations with him for a period of "well over a year." Mrs.
Bridgehouse told defendant that she was having a love affair

told him that
and other places.
he had moved into
in San Pedro

house home.
The defendant :filed a suit for divorce from his wife in
October, 1954. On
4, 1955, he filed an application
for a
order
Mrs. Bridgehouse from
or cohabiting with Bahr in the presence of
minor child. 'rhis ,,·as served on Mrs. Bridge7th. About
7th, defendant resigned from the sheriff's department. On the same day he
his gun, which he had bought as a service weapon while
with the sheriff's
out of hock and loaded it in
the pawn shop with the intention of selling it. On January
7th, after having been served with the restraining order, Mrs.
Bridgehouse telephoned defendant asking him to see her in
San Pedro. Defendant went to San Pedro, arriving there at
approximately 10 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. When
he reached the family home, he slept for a couple of hours.
When he awoke, Mrs. Bridgehouse told him that she would
:fight his divorce action and would not hesitate to lie or use
any other methods in so doing; that she would kill him if he
tried to take the children away from her. During this discussion, defendant apparently gave his wife, at her request,
two or three months to think things over and decide whether
or not she wanted him or Bahr. After this discussion, defendant left the house and went to Manhattan Beach returning to his wife's home between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening.
Mrs. Bridgehouse was not there at the time but returned
with the children sometime after 9 p. m. Defendant spent the
night there, and the next morning Mrs. Bridgehouse at de-

''service
where it vnw
shop he had
that when he
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not
it in the car because of
would not fit in the
when he went to the Huff house he was ''Tired.
tired.
to the
of exhaustion.''
mother-in-law said he looked as if he had been
hard and that
was
an<l she would
He said that he then walked
to
and that "It is
, but T believe
him, and is my reeollretion that at that time that I wanted
to discuss my
the
action that I was
and that I wanted to
it over with and
and talk it out with him"; tl1at he had no
idea \vhere Bahr \Yas or that he was there until he saw
him; that he seemed "to have a very vague memory of him
springing from the coneh"; that "As nrar as I ran possibly
reeonstruct in my mind, the next
I remember vvas
pulling the trigger on empty cartridges"; that "The whole
aetion was of sueh an explosive nature, yon
say, and
so distorted by a haze of mental void, you might say, that a
detailed remembranee of the whole action are
'; that
he believed he next walked into the kitchen, but didn't know
how much later it was; that while being questioned by the
officers "It is yery difficult to recall. AU I knew was that
I was in considerable pain at the time. I had a
deal of
difficulty in replying to the questions . . . as I remember, it
rthe pain] was in the region of the solar plexus or in the
thoracic or chest region"; that he had never had any pains
like that before; that many times in the past he had been so
fatigued he had not been able to speak rationally. The officer
who questioned him after the crime wai'i committed, said he
found defendant sitting at the kitehen table with his head
in his hands; that he sermed to be in pain and upset; that he
had difficulty in speaking and that his voiee seemed to rome in
sort of a "gasp." Shortly after the crime, the defendant
made the following statement to a police officer: ''About this
time I thought that I would tell Mr. Bahr what I wanted
to tell him for a long time, that I didn't want him around my
children, and I was really going to tell him off. I went out
of the bedroom [belonging to Mrs. Huff] and across the living
room to where Mr. Bahr vvas sitting on the divan. He looked
up or started to stand up. I really don't remember what.
~<\.s I stood in front of him, there >vas a table between us.
T don't remember if I said anything or not before taking
tbe gun out of my belt and shooting. I don't adua lly nwal1
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remember is that I realized my
on
defendant's
showed that his mother had
been committed to Camarillo State
; that he still
loved his wife and wanted her to
up Bahr and live with
him and
children and that he
the
for
and the order to show eause
foree her to ehoose
him
leave Bahr. The record also showed that defendant's
wife and Bahr had a joint bank account which was known to
defendant that one of defendant's eharge accounts had been
used to
a
for Bahr; that defendant had found Bahr's
hanging in the closets of his home; that he had paid
the entire support of his wife's son by her former marriage;
that he thought of the child as his own son and treated him
in the same way as he did his own son; that the ehild thought
he was his father and ealled him "Daddy." He testified that
he resigned his job in the sheriff's department because he felt
the position was ''detrimental to my family, and secondarily
very detrimental to my health'' since he was worn out
physically; that he had tried many times to get Mrs. Bridgehouse to go to a marriage counselor in order to work out their
difficulties. He testified that his wife had had a very unhappy childhood and unfortunate first marriage and that her
emotional disturbances were caused thereby; that she didn't
seem to want to lose him, nor did she want to give up Bahr.
When defendant was asked what his feeling was concerning
Bahr, he answered: ''I tried very much to make a non-entity
out of him in my own mind, in my mind's eye. I knew from
various sources that he was not the kind of person whom I
could consider an upright, solid citizen. I knew that you
can't force an adult to do something or not to do something
against their will. I had to leave the decision up to Mary,
and, yet, as I say, I also had my duty and my sacred oath
[his marriage
and my regard for my children to consider."
During the trial defendant was asked what his emotions
were when he saw Bahr in his mother-in-law's home. He
said: "It is a very difficult thing to describe. I recall trying
to discuss it. I believe it was with Officer Butts during one
of our interrogations. It was a feeling of great shock He
was living in my mother's house, or in my mother-in-law's
house or that she was virtually aeting as a panderer you might
say, and that the dreadful situation had gone as far as it had.''
He also said that his pallor and shakiness might have come
vHvL"HS

vW'fJLLv0

taken
in
what he had uee1cteu
asked of him
trial that he

classes: . . .
''Five. Persons who committed the
scions thereof. . . . "

charged without being con-
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abandoned and
har,
was no maliee
; there was no
of
ied; there was no evidenee of an "abandoned
heart.'' There was
eYidetJei' that d(•ft>ml<mt \ras
CXl·Pllent r·hu raetl'l';
that
and was
white
It appearR to ns, as
of law, that
under the circumstances
there was
to
in the reasonable man such a heat of
passiOn as would render an ordinary man of average disposition
to aet rm;;hly or without due deliberation and
refleetion
Y. Lowrn, 175 Cal.
49 [164 P. 1121]).
[4] \Ve are not unaware of defendant's second contention
that although he offered four instructions on the
effect
of uneonsciousness* which he relied upon as a defense no such
instruction >vas
An instruction on that subject should
have been
[5] As this court said in People v. Kelley,
supra, "\Yere ·we eompellecl, as
to either affirm the
judgment or reverse the case, we would be driven to the latter
course'' because of: this prejudieial error.
we have
eoneluded that we must exereise the power conferred upon us
by section 1181 of the Penal Code and reduce the
of
the crime from sreonc1 dPgrt•(; mnr<kr to that of manslaughter
v. Kelley, supra;
211 Cal. 322
[295 P. 333, 7l A.I..~.R 1385] ; People v. La Fleur, 42 Cal.
App.2d 50 [108 P.2<1
v.
37 Ca1.App.2d
311 [99 P.2cl 374] ;
60 Cal.App.2d 358 1140
P.2d 846]; People v. Daniel, 6!') Cal.App.2d 622 1151 P.211
275]; People v. Ross, :34 Cal.App.2d 574 [93 P.2c1 1019];
People v. Moreno, 6 Ca1.2d 480 1:)8 P.2d 6291 ; People v.
Holt., 25 Cal.2d 59 [153 P.2d 21];
v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d
72 [207 P.2d 51]).
We conclude, therefore, that the evidence
legally insnf:fi<;ient to snpport a judgment of second
murder hut that
it is legally sufficient to
a judgment of manslaughter.
The judgment of the trial eourt of second
murder
is modified and the cause remanded to the trial court with
directions to enter judgment against defendant finding him
of manslaughter and thereupon to pronounce judgment
upon him as prescribed by law.

case

C.

and Schauer,

"Penal Code, section 26, snhrlh·ision :>.

concurred.
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upon the authorP. 609] .) The cited
distinguishable. From the summary of the
it appears that there was
evidence here from which the jury could infer that defendant had a definite motive for
his
that he
had
made preparation for such killing, and that
the
was thereafter accomplished with "malice aforethought" and at the first opportunity. (Pen. Code, § 187.)
There was no comparable evidence in the Kelley case to support any one of the above-mentioned inferences. I am therefore of the view that the Kelley case is not controlling, and
that the evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain the conviction of second degree murder. (Pen. Code,
187, 189.)
In fact, said evidence appears to be sufficient to sustain an
inference that defendant's act constituted a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing," but these elements are
only required in sustaining a conviction of first degree as distinguished from second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 189.)
With respect to the alleged error in the failure of the trial
court to give an instruction, l find no evidence to support
the theory that defendant was unconscious at the time of the
killing. Defendant was asked : "You believe that in your con·
dition, as you were that Sunday morning, that you were capable of thinking correctly and rationally?'' He testified in
reply: "I thought so at the time. I rather doubt it now."
While defendant professed at the trial to be somewhat hazy
in his recollection concerning the events of the morning of the
killing, he did not testify at any time that he was unconscious
at the time of the kil1ing. If, however, there conld be found
any basis for the majority's conclusion that the evidence was
such as to require an instruction on the subject of unconsciousness, then the majority should reverse rather than reduce the
crime to manslaughter, as a person who does an act "without
being conscious thereof" does not commit voluntary manslaughter or any other crime by the doing of such act. (Pen.
Code, § 26, subd. 5.)
I would affirm the judgment and the order denying a new
trial.
Shenk, J., and McComb,

concurred.

